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Abstract This study suggests the preponderance of the pecking order theory over
the trade-off theory when there are greater problems of information asymmetry, which
is more usual in small-sized firms. The results show that debt level has an inverse rela-
tionship with non-debt tax shield and direct relationship with investment in fixed
assets, supporting the trade-off theory. However, the positive coefficient of growth
opportunities and negative coefficient of debt cost, age and cash flows is consistent
with the prediction of the pecking order theory. Results taken from a sample of small
Spanish companies in the footwear sector during the period 1998–2006, revealed that
in absence of asymmetric information, firms with positive cash flows will prefer debt
because (a) they want to maintain their optimal capital structure; (b) they have greater
needs to shield this cash flow from corporate tax and (c) they are concerned about
the problem of over-investments, which means that they issue debt in order to dis-
cipline the firm’s managers. The relationship between growth opportunities and debt
level was positive. This is not surprising due to the need to finance these investment
opportunities with debt, because rapidly growing firms are likely to have insufficient
earnings to finance internally all of their growth. Furthermore, the low debt level of
companies in the Spanish footwear sector also helps to explain this relationship due to
the importance of R&D investments for this industry, which lenders value as strategic
investments. Finally, small businesses face high transaction costs derived from typical
agency problems and financial restriction on capital markets. Such high transaction
costs justify the gap between the target and the current debt level and are responsible
for the slow approach of their debt level to the target ratio.
M. A. Acedo-Ramírez (B) · J. C. Ayala-Calvo · J. E. Rodríguez-Osés
Dpto. Economía y Empresa, Universidad de La Rioja, C/Cigüeña 60,
26004 Logroño, La Rioja, Spain
e-mail: miguel-angel.acedo@unirioja.es
123
156 SERIEs (2013) 4:155–173




The financial structure of companies and its influence on the value of company stock
has been a recurring theme in financial literature since the late 1950s. However, despite
the huge number of studies published on this subject, there is still no consensus among
academics on whether an optimal financial structure actually exists or on the factors
that influence this financial structure. Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller (1977)
claimed that the market value of a company is independent of its financial structure.
Modigliani and Miller (1963), when examining the influence of corporate income tax
on capital structure, concluded that due to fiscal deductibility of interest, the market
value of an indebted company must be greater than that of the same company with-
out debts. Deangelo and Masulis (1980) argued that companies that enjoy non-debt
tax shields (NDTSs) have fewer incentives to become indebted. Two main theories
currently dominate the capital structure debate: the trade-off theory and the pecking
order theory.
The trade-off theory (Myers 1984) supports the existence of an optimal capital
structure, an optimal debt ratio that is determined by the contrasting benefits of debt
(tax shield, disciplinary role of debt, reduction of free cash flow problems and the fact
that debt suffers less from informational costs than outside equity) and the cost of debt
(financial distress costs and the agency costs between shareholders and bondholders)
(Jalilvand and Harris 1984; Frank and Goyal 2000).
However, according to the pecking order theory (Myers andMajluf 1984), the exis-
tence of information asymmetry between the company and the market means that
managers prefer to finance projects with internally generated funds (retained earn-
ings or cash-flows), which involve no asymmetric information problems, rather than
resorting to external financing. If they need external funds, they prefer debt to equity
in order to reduce the information asymmetry. Thus, there is a preference ranking
over financing sources, beginning with internal funds, followed by debt and finally by
equity.
Both financial structure theories are not mutually exclusive but rather it is con-
sidered that the pecking order theory is embedded within the trade-off theory. The
pecking order theory is based on the existence of information asymmetry, which is
just one of the costs considered by the trade-off theory. Empirical evidence shows the
partial validity of both theories but differs in specifying which theory is the prevailing
one. This dialectic controversy between the trade-off theory and the pecking order
theory, fuelled by the importance that different authors have attributed to the variables
used to explain company leverage, could be due to various causes as well, which are
sometimes inter-related:
(a) The size of the companies included in samples. Most research on capital
structure has been performed with samples of large publicly listed companies
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(Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999; Fama and French 2002; De Miguel and Pin-
dado 2001). Very few studies have focused on small and medium-sized firms
(Cassar and Holmes 2003; Sogorb 2005). Small firms often suffer the problems
associated with asymmetric information when they seek new financing (Ang
1992). In this sense, they seem to be affected by the typical problems analysed
by the pecking order theory. However, these companies could also have a target
debt level to guide their financial policy, as indicated by the trade-off theory.
(b) The different institutional frameworks of the countries where firms obtain reve-
nues. Many studies on financial structure have focused on companies that obtain
their revenues in financial systems based on the Anglo-Saxon system. The few
studies on non-American companies include those by Rajan and Zingales (1995),
Wald (1999), and Mcclure et al. (1999), who analysed samples of companies
based in G7 countries. The results of these studies showed that the different
institutional frameworks of the different countries can affect companies’ capital
structures. Certainly, there is not enough evidence on how theories formulated for
firms operating in major developed markets can be applied to firms outside these
markets, and in countries with different institutional and legal environments.
(c) The methodology used in research. Most research faces two problems: it does
not shed any light on the adjustment process of capital structure and they use
statistical methods to check the different hypotheses presented that do not take
into account the presence of unobservable heterogeneity, which refers to omitted
variables that affect the outcome of interest and are correlated with the covar-
iates. In regards to the adjustment process in our model, it should be said that
capital structure decisions are dynamic by nature and should be modelled as
such. Companies try to adjust their debt levels to the desired objective. In this
study, we used a target adjustment model to explain current debt according to
past debt and the firm’s target debt level; the latter included in the model as a
linear function of the factors determining capital structure (Lööf 2004; Gaud
et al. 2005; González and González 2007). If there is a target debt level, then
firms should take appropriate steps to reach this objective. But the existence of
transaction costs means that companies do not automatically adjust their levels
of indebtedness to the target level. We used this to obtain a dynamic model with
predetermined variables, estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments,
which allowed us to solve endogeneity problems by using instruments. In regards
to the second problem, in this work, by using panel data methodology we also
took into account unobservable heterogeneity since the companies had different
characteristics that were difficult to observe, obtain or measure.
(d) Finally, most empirical studies of financial structure have been performed using
samples without specifying the sectors to which the companies pertained. That
approach has one drawback, namely that the specific characteristics of such
diverse branches of activity are diluted in the overall results obtained. We felt it
was better to perform a more in-depth study of one of the most interesting indus-
tries (the footwear sector) because the general results obtained in other papers
did not necessarily have to coincide with those of specific sectors. It would be
reasonable to suppose that specific characteristics of a given industry could also
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Table 1 Spanish footwear industry
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
No. of
companies
34.347 34.237 34.679 34.013 33.301 31.941 29.652 28.414
Industrial
GDP (e)
7,443,000 7,397,000 6,936,210 6,913,352 6,404,026 5,960,293 5,859,860 5,636,930
Industrial
GDP (%)




3.04 2.43 2.17 2.10 2.49 0.87 1.50 1.44
Debt level (%) – – – 26.14 27.88 28.49 28.89 28.96
The debt ratio is measured as the ratio between the book value of long-term debt and the book value of
equity plus the book value of long-term debt
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Iberian Balances Analysis System SABI
influence the capital structure of the firm (Kayo and Kimura 2010). Ross et al.
(2008) and Lemmon et al. (2008) point to inter-industry differences in debt ratios.
Frank and Goyal (2009) find that industry leverage is an important determinant
of firm leverage.
In this paper we study the footwear sector for different reasons: according to the
Spanish Footwear Federation, Spain is the second footwear producing and exporting
country in the European Union and the footwear sector is one of the industries which
is most open to foreignmarkets. The footwear sector generates 0.76% of Spanish GDP
at market prices, employs 0.23% of the working population and represents 0.80% of
gross investment in assets. It is an old activity that has almost disappeared in some
European countries like Germany or France, and is currently undergoing a process of
reorganisation and permanent reinvention in Spain and Italy. Specifically, the weight
of this sector in the Industrial GDP of Spain has decreased 18.95% in the period
2005–2007 (see Table 1).
The Spanish footwear industry is highly competitive, has a low level of indebted-
ness and is a strong investor in innovation. These factors can influence the relationship
between the level of indebtedness and some of the explanatory variables. One of the
variables most commonly used to measure the degree of rivalry between industries
is the adjustment between supply and demand in each sector. The adjustment in the
demand can be approximated by the change in GDP, while the adjustment of supply is
usually measured (among other variables) through the variation in capacity (number
of companies) or modification of exit barriers (mortality of enterprises). The footwear
industry is the only sector in Spain whose GDP has decreased in recent years. In the
period 2000–2007, theGDPof the footwear industry has fallen approximately 24.27%,
while the number of firms has declined only 17.27% (see Table 1). This mismatch,
which means an increase in industry rivalry, is evident when looking at the decline in
the profit margins of the period analysed (−52.5%). Furthermore, the average level
of indebtedness of the footwear industry in the period 2003–2007 (28.07%) is below
the average for Spanish industry as a whole (31.06%) (see Table 1). More specifically,
it is one of the 10 sectors with the lowest level of indebtedness in Spain. Moreover,
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according to data obtained in the Business Strategies Survey, the footwear industry is
the leading industry in terms of investment in product innovation. The investment in
product innovation quantifies the effort in the development of new products or changes
in the products, which are so important that the new versions are completely differ-
ent from the original ones (use of new materials, new components, new design and
presentation, new features, new uses, etc.). Given the important challenges facing this
sector (need to operate and compete in increasingly globalised markets, need to be
continually innovative in products and processes, need to achieve a minimum size in
order to achieve economies of scale, outsourcing, etc.), having a balanced financial
structure that provides the necessary funds at the lowest possible cost is a key for the
survival and success of companies in this sector.
Taking into account the above-mentioned reasoning, it is important to highlight that
this research, unlike previous studies, was conductedwith a sample of small businesses
from the footwear sector that obtained financing exclusively in the Spanishmarket, and
that we used the panel data methodology to take into consideration the unobservable
heterogeneity. This paper focuses on small Spanish businesses financing, as this type
of company represents a large proportion of total companies in the economy. Most
of the research on capital structure of Spanish small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
had been essentially descriptive (Maroto 1996; López and Romero 1997) or the firm
sample did not specify the sectors to which the companies pertained (Sogorb 2005;
López and Sogorb 2008). Acedo and Rodríguez (2003) analysed the debt level of the
footwear industry only in the autonomous community of La Rioja. Using an analysis
of variance, they analyzed whether the debt level differed between the footwear and
agriculture industries, the latter being themain sector in La Rioja.Muchmore recently,
studies of financial structure in small Spanish firms have incorporated different esti-
mation techniques such as the analysis of variance (López and Aybar 2000; Acedo and
Rodríguez 2003) and panel data estimation, using a static (Sogorb 2005) or a dynamic
linear model (López and Sogorb 2008).
Our study presents five main differences from those references cited before for the
Spanish context: (a) it employs a sample of small firms and an objective definition
of small companies that is valid for the European Union, (b) the firm sample covers
one important activity (the footwear industry) in the Spanish economy in more than
one Autonomous Community, as is the case in Acedo and Rodríguez (2003), (c) it
increases the number of theoretical hypotheses considering other variables such as
debt cost and age, (d) it provides evidence of the influence of the asymmetric infor-
mation variable in the relationship between cash flow and debt level, and (e) it applies
the panel data methodology in the estimation of a dynamic linear model allowing for
individual heterogeneity and time effects. This technique allows us to study the speed
of adjustment of small Spanish footwear firms toward their capital structure target.
Following this line of research, we aim to obtain the main determinants of capital
structure in small Spanish footwear businesses from the perspective of the two finan-
cial approaches mentioned above. More specifically, we ask the following questions:
Can the type of relationship between indebtedness and the main variables that influ-
ence capital structure proposed in previous work be maintained for a small sample of
Spanish companies in the footwear industry? What is the relationship and the impor-
tance of the variables (NDTS, growth opportunities, tangibility of assets, debt cost,
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age and cash flow) in explaining the financial structure of the small, Spanish, footwear
business?
Our results provide empirical evidence of the predominance of the pecking order
theory over the trade-off theory in the explanation of the capital structure of small Span-
ish footwear firms. We provide evidence of the higher transaction cost (lower speed
of adjustment) of the small Spanish footwear firms. Growth opportunities showed a
significant direct relationship with leverage, due to (a) the need to finance these invest-
ment opportunities which, ceteris paribus, will lead to the use of more debt, (b) the low
level of indebtedness of Spanish footwear firms and the importance of R&D invest-
ments in this sector. Finally, the results show that when asymmetric information is not
important, profitable firms tend to issue more debt in order to limit over-investment
and maintain their optimal capital structure by reducing the amount of taxes they pay.
The article is divided into six sections. Section 2 summarises previous studies on
capital structure. Section 3 describes the database and defines the variables used in
the study. Sections 4 and 5 present the econometric specification of the model and the
empirical evidence. Section 6 presents the main conclusions that can be drawn from
the analysis.
2 Determinants of capital structure: trade-off versus pecking order
2.1 Non-debt tax shield
As predicted by the trade-off theory, a major motivation for using debt instead of
equity is to save corporate tax. However, firms can use NDTSs in order to pay fewer
taxes. Deangelo and Masulis (1980) affirm that companies with larger NDTSs, cete-
ris paribus, are less indebted. These companies have less need to issue debt in order
to take advantage of interest tax deductions because they already enjoy tax bene-
fits. Taxes are still relevant even when we are only considering a particular sector
because even though all companies in this sector have the same tax system, what we
are really looking at is whether the existence of NDTSs (amortization, investment tax
credits, job creation credits, etc.) influences the level of that debt. Most empirical evi-
dence confirms an indirect relationship between NDTSs and debt level (Wald 1999;
Sogorb 2005; Huang and Song 2006). Taking into consideration the above-mentioned
reasoning, we proposed the following hypothesis:
H1 : an inverse relationship is expected between debt level and NDTSs.
2.2 Growth opportunities
One of the determinants of capital structure is the existence of growth opportunities.
The trade-off theory predicts that investment opportunities are generally associated
with less leverage, given that greater investment opportunities: (a) are associated with
a lower free cash flow and less need for the disciplinary role of debt over manager
behaviour (Jensen 1986), (b) have more agency conflicts between stockholders and
lenders because shareholders have greater possibilities of risk-shifting substitution
(Myers 1977). Furthermore, financial distress cost increases with growth opportuni-
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ties. Growth opportunities lose substantial value in the event of bankruptcy; hence
lenders, since they have fewer guarantees, react by providing the company with less
financing, and charge larger risk premiums on the cost of debt (Frank and Goyal 2009.
Different empirical works have found an inverse relationship between growth oppor-
tunities and debt (Huang and Song 2006; Kayo and Kimura 2010). Thus, we proposed
the following hypothesis.
H2a: an inverse relationship is expected between growth opportunities (GO) and
debt level.
However, the pecking order theory predicts a direct relationship between leverage
and growth opportunities (Frank and Goyal 2009). Rapidly growing firms are likely
to have insufficient earnings to finance all of their growth internally and they will seek
external financing. Growth is likely to put a strain on retained earnings and push the
firm into borrowing (Myers 1984;Michaelas et al. 1999). Between the empirical papers
that find a direct relationship between growth opportunities and leverage we have De
Miguel and Pindado (2001), Goyal et al. (2002), Murray and Goyal (2003), Sogorb
(2005) and Casson et al. (2007). Following this line of reasoning, the hypothesis could
be established as:
H2b: a direct relationship is expected between growth opportunities (GO) and debt
level.
2.3 Tangibility of assets
According to the trade-off theory, tangible assets have an impact on debt because, if
a large fraction of a firm’s assets are tangible assets, then the assets should serve as
collateral, thus diminishing the lender’s risk of suffering the agency costs deriving
from debt (Frank and Goyal 2009). It is therefore expected that a positive relationship
exists between tangibility and leverage (Booth et al. 2001; Huang and Song 2006;
Frank and Goyal 2009; Céspedes et al. 2010; Chakraborty 2010; Kayo and Kimura
2010). Therefore, based on the aforementioned theoretical framework, we propose the
hypothesis:
H3a: a direct relationship is expected between investment in fixed assets (I) and
debt level.
However, from the perspective of the pecking order theory, firms with more tangi-
ble assets are less subject to information asymmetries and will therefore issue equity
rather than debt when they need external financing (Harris and Raviv 1991; González
and González 2007; Frank and Goyal 2009). Therefore, this theory predicts a inverse
relationship between the analysed variables.
H3b: an inverse relationship is expected between investment in fixed assets (I) and
debt level.
2.4 Debt cost
The interest rate can influence the financial structure. According to the trade-off the-
ory, an increase of the interest rate makes the debt more attractive because it provides
greater potential for tax deduction (Taggart 1985). Thus, there is a direct relationship
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between leverage and debt cost. This relationship is confirmed by different empirical
papers (Bougheas et al. 2006; Frank and Goyal 2009). The proposed hypothesis is:
H4a: a direct relationship is expected between the interest rate (IN) and debt level.
However, according to the pecking order theory, managers have a preference for
issuing debt when interest rates are low or when interest rates are expected to increase
(Van Horne 1977; Graham and Harvey 2001). When interest rates are low, firms take
advantage in order to increase their leverage (Cuñat 1999; Barry et al. 2008). Then, an
inverse relationship it is expected between debt cost and leverage. This kind of rela-
tionship is found in different papers (Cuñat 1999; Barry et al. 2008). The proposed
hypothesis is:
H4b: an inverse relationship is expected between the interest rate (IN) and debt
level.
2.5 Age
The trade-off theory predicts that older firms not only face less bankruptcy problems
and lower agency costs but that they are also more established, have a better reputa-
tion, credit history and a greater tendency to choose safe investment projects (Diamond
1989; López and Sogorb 2008; Frank and Goyal 2009). By contrast, younger firms
will have a greater tendency to choose riskier projects. The implication is that there is
a direct relationship between age and the debt level. Boot (2000) and Bougheas et al.
(2006) find empirical evidence in favour of this relationship:
H5a: a direct relationship is expected between age (AG) and debt level.
However, according to the pecking order theory, more mature companies tend to
have higher cash flow generated internally over the years, so a lower debt level is
expected. On the contrary, younger firms cannot retain earnings as easily as older
firms can (Myers and Majluf 1984; López and Sogorb 2008; Frank and Goyal 2009).
We find empirical evidence in favour of this kind of relationship (Michaelas et al.
1999; Hall and Graham 2000; López and Sogorb 2008).
H5b: an inverse relationship is expected between age (AG) and debt level.
2.6 Cash flow or profitability
According to the pecking order theory, managers prefer internal to external financing
because cash flow generated internally is not affected by problems of information
asymmetry between manager and outside investors. If they need external financing,
they prefer debt over equity. Thus, there is a preference ranking over financing sources,
beginning with internal funds, followed by debt and finally by equity. Therefore, we
should expect a negative relationship between debt and cash-flow.
Nevertheless, the trade-off theory (Myers 1984) suggests a direct relationship
between debt and cash flow. According to the trade-off theory, when firms are profit-
able, they should prefer debt in order to maintain their optimal capital structure and
because they have greater needs to shield this cash flow from corporate tax. In addi-
tion, firm’s managers with free cash flow tend to invest in projects with a negative net
present value (over investment problem). One possible solution for this problem is the
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issuing of debt forcing the payment of interest. Debt mitigates agency costs associated
with an excess cash flow and disciplines the firm’s managers (Jensen 1986).
Most previous empirical studies have identified an inverse relationship between cash
flow and indebtedness (Giannetti 2003; Chen 2004; Huang and Song 2006; Frank and
Goyal 2009; Céspedes et al. 2010; Chakraborty 2010; Kayo andKimura 2010). Barton
et al. (1989) and Jensen et al. (1992) show a positive relationship.
Consequently, in the presence of asymmetric information and agency problems, we
propose two hypotheses:
H6a: an inverse relationship is expected between cash flow and debt level.
H6b: a direct relationship is expected between cash flow and debt level.
Table 2 summarises the relationship postulated by the theory between each explan-
atory variable and leverage.
3 Database description and variable definition
Our database was created using individualized public information (standardised bal-
ance sheets and income statements) that Spanish companies from the footwear sec-
tor are required to submit to the Mercantile Registry for the period 1998–2006.
This information was obtained from the Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos
(SABI) database which is managed by Grupo Informa S.A. and Bureau Van Dyck
and purports to represent more than 95% of the Spanish companies. The firms in
the sample meet the definition established by the European Union for small busi-
nesses (recommendation 2003/361/EC): <50 workers and an annual turnover or
assets below 10 million euros. The initial sample consisted of all the Spanish small
companies pertaining to section 193 Footwear Manufacture of the National Clas-
sification of Economic Activities (CNAE-93) for which data were available for all
variables for at least on year in the period analysed (861 firms). Given the usual
requirements of dynamic panel data models and in order to avoid problems of unob-
servable heterogeneity and endogeneity, we constructed an unbalanced data panel
comprising 299 companies for which information was available for at least three
consecutive years between 1998 and 2006. As a result, we obtained an unbal-
anced panel, whose structure by number of observations per company is shown in
Table 3.
In this study we use book values for the variables because information about market
values was unavailable as the sample is composed of small unlisted companies. The
variables used in the model explaining capital structure were:
Debt ratio (D), measured as the ratio between the book value of long-term debt
and the book value of equity plus the book value of long-term debt: Dit = Long term
debtit/Equityit + Long term debtit (De Miguel and Pindado 2001). The advantage of
measuring debt this way is that it is themost stable way tomeasure leverage. This mea-
sure of leverage is more fixed and arguably more deliberate, with greater contractual
obligations and screening processes required (Cassar and Holmes 2003).
Non-debt tax shield has been defined in the majority of papers as the depreciation
and amortization expenses (Bradley et al. 1984; Wald 1999; Chaplinsky and Niehaus
1993; Deesomsak et al. 2004). However, amortization and depreciation expenses are
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NDTS − Companies with larger
non-debt tax shields, ceteris
paribus, have less need to
issue debt in order to take
advantage of interest tax
deductions because they
already enjoy tax benefits
GO − Greater growth opportunities:
(a) are associated with a
lower free cash flow and
less need for the
disciplinary role of debt, (b)
have more agency conflicts
between stockholders and
lenders and (c) increase
financial distress cost
+ Rapidly growing firms are
likely to have insufficient
earnings to finance all of
their growth internally and
they will seek external
financing. Growth is likely
to put a strain on retained
earnings and push the firm
into borrowing
I + If a large fraction of a firm’s
assets are tangible assets,
then the assets should serve
as collateral, thus
diminishing the lender’s
risk of suffering the agency
costs derived from debt
− Firms with more tangible
assets are less subject to
information asymmetries
and will therefore issue
equity rather than debt
IN + An increase of the interest
rate makes debt more
attractive because of its
greater potential for tax
deduction
− Managers have a preference
for issuing debt when
interest rates are low or
when interest rates are
expected to increase
AG + Older and more established
firms, with more credit
history, have a greater
tendency to choose safe
investment projects
− More mature companies tend
to have higher cash flow
generated internally over
the years, so a lower debt
level is expected
CF + Firms should prefer debt (a)
in order to maintain their
optimal capital structure,
(b) because they have
greater needs to shield this
cash flow from corporate
tax, and c) to discipline the
firm’s managers






“+” means that leverage increases with the factor, “−” means that leverage decreases with the factor
highly correlated with tangibility, which is also expected to affect the leverage of
firms. In order to avoid this problem, we will measure the NDTSs as the difference
between earnings before taxes and the results of taxes paid divided by the tax rate
(Titman and Wessels 1988; De Miguel and Pindado 2001; González and González
2007): NDTSit = (EBTit − (Taxes paidit/Tax rate it))/Kit. Therefore, the variable
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Table 3 Structure of the sample









Data of companies for which the information is available for at least three consecutive years, between years
1998–2006, have been extracted. The resultant unbalanced panel comprises 299 Spanish companies (1,206
observations)
includes those quantities of earnings that were not taxed due to the existence of
NDTSs.
Growth opportunities (GO) have beenmeasuredwith different proxies.Wald (1999)
and López and Sogorb use the average of sales growth. Rajan and Zingales (1995) use
Tobin’s Q (market-to-book ratio of total assets) and Booth et al. (2001) use the market-
to-book ratio of equity. We argue that sales growth rate is the past growth experience,
while the other two proxies are better measures for growth. But because none of our
sample firms are listed in a stock exchange, we use the ratio between intangible assets
and total assets (Bradley et al. 1984; Titman andWessels 1988; Michaelas et al. 1999):
GOit = intangible assetsit/Kit.
Investments (I) weremeasured as the ratio of the difference between net fixed assets
in the current and previous periods, plus depreciation expenditure in the current period
divided by total assets (Lewellen and Badrinath 1997; De Miguel and Pindado 2001):
Iit = (NFAit − NFAit−1 + Depreciationit)/Kit.
Debt cost (IN) is measured by the ratio of financial expenses between the total debts
(Cuñat 1999; Barry et al. 2008).
Age (AG) is measured by time elapsed between the creation date and the current
year (Michaelas et al. 1999; Hall and Graham 2000; López and Sogorb 2008).
Cash flow (CF) was the ratio of the addition of earnings before interest and taxes
(EBIT) and non-cash deductions (depreciations and provisions) divided by total assets:
CFit = (EBITit + Depreciationit + Provisionsit)/Kit (De Miguel and Pindado 2001).
Asymmetric information (AI) was measured as the proportion of tangible fixed
assets and intangible assets. The presence of intangible assets reveals greater prob-
lems of asymmetric information than tangible assets. A factor analysis with principal
components was performed using the variables of tangible fixed assets and intangible
assets (De Miguel and Pindado 2001). The coordinates of these variables on the first
factorial axis were 0.2190 and −0.2190 for tangible fixed assets and intangible assets,
respectively, the Eigen value being 0.09590 (difference is 0.17627, proportion 6.1730
and cumulative 6.1730).
Therefore, we constructed a factor that would be positive when the company had a
high proportion of tangible fixed assets and, consequently, fewer problems of asym-
metric information. This factor would be negative if intangible assets were the main
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Table 4 Statistic summary of the dependent and independent variables
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Dit 0.3110 0.2376 0.0004 0.8925
NDTSit 0.00198 0.0232 −0.2198 0.2132
GOit 0.0457 0.0698 0 0.5648
Iit 0.0603 0.0782 −0.5411 0.5516
INit 0.0630 0.1369 0 0.2931
AGit 11.88 6.0207 4 46
CFit 0.0954 0.0617 −0.0111 0.5198
Employees 19.2 8.4 10 50
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our estimations. Dit denotes the ratio of
the book value of long-term debt and the book value of equity plus the long-term debt; NDTSit denotes the
non-debt tax shield measure as the ratio of the difference between earnings before taxes and the results of
taxes paid divided by the tax rate; GOit denotes the growth opportunities measure as the intangible assets to
total assets; Iit denotes the investment in net fixed assets measure as the ratio of the difference between net
fixed assets in the current and previous periods, plus depreciation expenditure in the current period divided
by total assets, INit denotes the debt cost measure as the ratio of financial expenses between total debts,
AGit denotes the firm age, measure by the time elapsed between the creation date and the current year and
CFit denotes the cash flow measure as the ratio of the addition of earnings before interest and taxes and
non-cash deductions (depreciations and provisions) divided by total assets
assets and therewould therefore be greater problems of asymmetric information. Start-
ing with this factor, we constructed a dummy variable—AIit—which took the value
1 when the factor was positive (therefore, predominately tangible fixed assets) and
zero when the factor was negative (therefore, predominately intangible assets). This
variable interacted with cash flow in order to determine the sensitivity of indebtedness
to cash flow in the presence or absence of asymmetric information.
Table 4 shows the descriptive results of the level of indebtedness and its explanatory
variables, as well as the number of employees.
4 Econometric specification of the model
According to the theoretical framework described above, the target debt level of a firm
may be explained by the NDTSs, growth opportunities, investments, debt cost, age
and cash flow.
D∗it = β1 + β2 · NDTSit + β3 · GOit + β4 · Iit
+β5 · INit + β6 · AGit + β7 · CFit + εit (1)
The existence of transaction costsmeans that companies do not automatically adjust
their levels of indebtedness to the target level, therefore:
Dit − Dit−1 = α · (D∗it − Dit−1), 0 < α < 1 (2)
where Dit and Dit−1 are the actual debt levels in the current and previous period,
respectively. D∗it is the target debt level and α measures the adjustment speed. Trans-
action costs are inversely related to α and can be referred to as 1−α. If the adjustment
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speed is very high α = 1, the companies automatically adjust their indebtedness level
to the targeted level of indebtedness Dit = D∗it . If, in contrast, the speed of adjustment
is null α = 0, companies prefer to do nothing Dit = Di t−1. When the speed of adjust-
ment is at an intermediate level 0 < α < 1, companies adjust their indebtedness level
to the target debt level in a direct manner as to adjustment speed.
Equation 2 provides the current level of indebtedness:
Dit = α · D∗it + (1 − α) · Dit−1 (3)
By integrating Eqs. 1 and 3, and bearing in mind that we are working with panel data,
we obtained model I:
Dit = α · β1 + (1 − α) · Di,t−1 + α · β2 · NDTSit + α · β3 · GOit + ·β4 · Iit
+α · β5 · INit + α · β6 · AGit + α · β7 · CFit + dt + ηi + εit (4)
where dt is the time-specific or temporal effect (effect of macroeconomic variables on
capital structure), ηi is the firm-specific effect (to control for unobservable heteroge-
neity) and εit is a white noise or random disturbance.
Equation model (4) can be modified taking into account the influence of the exis-
tence of asymmetric information on cash flow. The new model (model II) to be esti-
mated would be:
Dit = α · β1 + (1 − α) · Di,t−1 + α · β2 · NDTSit + α · β3 · GOit + α · β4 · Iit
+α · β5 · INit + α · β6 · AGit + α · (β7 + β8 · AIit) · CFit + dt + ηi + εit
(5)
The dynamic model with predetermined variables was estimated by using first dif-
ferences with a two-step generalised method of moments (GMM) using the Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimator, as this model includes the lagged-dependent variable as
an explanatory variable. We use the GMM to avoid problems of unobservable het-
erogeneity and endogeneity. Unobservable heterogeneity refers to omitted variables
that affect the outcome of interest and are correlated with the covariates. We took
into account the unobservable heterogeneity (such as the particular small firm idio-
syncrasy) through the individual effect of the companies ηi, which is assumed to be
different for every company and constant over time.1 It was also evident from the
specification of the model that endogeneity problems could arise in the regressors due
to: (a) the time which normally elapses between making the decision to change the
capital structure and its execution; and (b) the possible relationship between certain
explanatory variables (for instance, investment) and the variable to be explained. As
a result, all the right-hand side variables of the models lagged twice (or more) are
included as instruments,2 which also allowed for the consideration of possible errors
1 This technique enables us to eliminate the potential biases in the resulting estimates due to correlation
between unobservable heterogeneity ηiand the explanatory variables included in the study.
2 The GMM accounts for endogeneity by using instruments. Since our model is in first differ-
ences, values of the right-hand side variables lagged two periods are valid instruments, as proposed by
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in the measurement of the variables. Moreover, a set of tests are undertaken in our
model to verify the degree of consistency and robustness of the results obtained. More
specifically, Sargan’s test of over-identifying restrictions, tests of absence of both first
and second order autocorrelation of residuals, and Wald’s test of joint significance of
the regressors and the time dummies are carried out. The model was estimated using
the Stata programme (version 9).
5 Empirical evidence and discussion
To check for potential misspecification of the models, we used m2 statistics, which
tested for lack of second-order serial correlation in first-difference residuals. The
results obtained did not allowus to reject the null hypothesis of absence of second-order
serial correlation between the errors. However, because of the transformation, there
was no lack of first-order serial correlation m1 in the differenced residual, although
the errors in the model in levels were not serially correlated. Nor could we reject the
null hypothesis of absence of correlation between the instruments and the error term
of Sargan’s test of over-identifying restrictions (see Table 5). Table 5 also shows the
two contrasts of Wald’s test. The former null hypothesis checks the joint significance
of the explanatory variables z1, whereas the second one z2 checks the joint signifi-
cance of the time dummies. Both results of Wald’s test validated the proposed partial
adjustment model.
In accordance with the specification of the model proposed, the results show that
the coefficient of the level of indebtedness delayed 1 year (1 − α) is significant.
This coefficient (0.4194) measures the transaction costs, thus implying an adjustment
speed of α = 0.5806. The results showed that the companies from the footwear sector
had higher transaction costs than those reported by DeMiguel and Pindado (2001) for
Spanish companies in general (0.2095). The higher importance of the transaction costs
of footwear companies may be due to the size of the companies studied. Thus, while
DeMiguel and Pindado based their results on large firms listed on the stock exchange,
all the companies in our sample were small. The higher transaction costs may origi-
nate from greater asymmetric information and agency conflicts existing in small-sized
enterprises between shareholders-owners and lenders, in addition to increasing both
the moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Ang 1992). Moreover, these trans-
action costs are higher in small firms because they cannot benefit from economies of
scale (Wijst and Thurik 1993; Berger and Udell 1998).
The results of the econometric analysis revealed the significance of the analysed
coefficients of the financial variables. The results reveal that debt has an inverse rela-
tionship with NDTS, debt cost, firm age and cash flow and a direct relationship with
growth opportunities and investment. In summary, while the negative coefficient of
Footnote 2 continued
Anderson and Hsiao (1982). However, the efficiency of the estimation can be significantly improved by
using all the orthogonality conditions that exist between lagged values of the right-hand side variables and
the first differences of the error term. We thus follow this estimation strategy, proposed by Arellano and
Bond (1991), which consists of using all the right-hand side variables lagged twice or more as instruments
in order to improve efficiency.
123
SERIEs (2013) 4:155–173 169
Table 5 Estimation (299 companies, 1,206 observations; dependent variable: Dit)
Variable/test Regression coefficients/statistic (p value)
Model I Model II
Dit−1 0.4194* (0.000) 0.4228* (0.000)
NDTSit −0.1638* (0.000) −0.2689* (0.000)
GOit 1.1087* (0.000) 0.9867* (0.000)
Iit 0.2235* (0.000) 0.2572* (0.000)
INit −0.0851* (0,000) −0.0873* (0.000)
AGit −0.0113* (0,000) −0.0153* (0.000)
CFit −0.5071* (0.000) −0.4355* (0.000)
AIit×CFit – 1.2119* (0.000)
z1 12180.81* (0.000) 67926.39* (0.000)
z2 41.08* (0.000) 162.14* (0.000)
m1 −4.72* (0.000) −4.74* (0.000)
m2 1.01 (0.313) 0.98 (0.327)
Sargan 183.69 (0.843) 204.98 (0.850)
Dit denotes the ratio of the book value of long-term debt and the book value of equity plus the long-term
debt; NDTSit denotes the non-debt tax shield measure as the ratio of the difference between earnings before
taxes and the results of taxes paid divided by the tax rate, divided by total assets; GOit denotes the growth
opportunities measure as the intangible assets to total assets; Iit denotes the investment in net fixed assets
measure as the ratio of the difference between net fixed assets in the current and previous periods, plus
depreciation expenditure in the current period divided by total assets, INit denotes the debt cost measure
as the ratio of financial expenses between total debts, AGit denotes the firm age, measured by the time
elapsed between the creation date and the current year, CFit denotes the cash flow measure as the ratio of
the addition of earnings before interest and taxes and non-cash deductions (depreciations and provisions)
divided by total assets and AIit × CFit denotes the interaction between the dummy variable Asymmetric
Information and the cash flow, previously defined
Other information needed to read this table is: (i) p values in parentheses, taking into account that heteroske-
dasticity consistent asymptotic errors are used for the regression coefficients; (ii) * indicates significance
at the 1% level; (iii) z1 is a Wald test of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, asymptotically
distributed as chi-square under the null of all regression coefficients are zero; z2 is a Wald test of the joint
significance on the time dummies, asymptotically distributed as chi-square under the null of all regres-
sion coefficients are zero; (iv) mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences,
asymptotically distributed as N(0, 1) under the null of no serial correlation; (v) Sargan is a test of the
over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as chi-square under the null of no relation between
the instruments and the error term
the NDTSs and positive coefficient of tangibility are favourable to the arguments of
the trade-off theory, the positive coefficient of growth opportunities and negative coef-
ficient of debt cost, age and cash flows is consistent with the prediction of the pecking
order theory. These results constitute a greater support for the pecking order theory
which is consistent with the fact that our sample is comprised of small firms. Thus, the
pecking order theory has more validity in this type of firm. This result support Sogorb
(2005) who find that the financing of SMEs relies on internal resources instead of
external means.
According to the trade-off theory, NDTSs presented a significant inverse relation-
ship with indebtedness, thus confirming the hypothesis that NDTSs act as debt sub-
stitutes to reduce tax burdens (Wald 1999; Sogorb 2005; Huang and Song 2006).
Our results, in line with the theoretical framework of the trade-off theory and findings
reported in previous studies (Huang and Song 2006; Céspedes et al. 2010; Chakraborty
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2010; Kayo and Kimura 2010) revealed a direct relationship between investment in
fixed assets and leverage. Therefore, for Spanish footwear companies, investment
decisions and financing are inter-related. Thus, these types of business investments,
in addition to increasing debt capacity, also serve as collateral, reducing lenders’ risks
of suffering the agency costs of debt.
Growth opportunities showed a significant direct relationship with leverage, sup-
porting the pecking order theory. This may be due to two reasons: (a) investment
opportunities give rise to strong financing needs which, ceteris paribus, will lead to
the use of more debt, (b) the low level of indebtedness of Spanish footwear firms
and the importance of R&D investments in this sector (Business Strategies Survey).
The positive relationship between growth opportunities and debt was due to a below
critical level of indebtedness; hence, even in the case of assets with little value in the
event of liquidation, lenders are willing to lend funds because investment in R&D is
essential for a highly competitive industry where investments in patents, trademarks,
design, etc. are fundamental requirements for companies to survive in an increasingly
globalised market. These results confirm those obtained by De Miguel and Pindado
(2001), Goyal et al. (2002),Murray andGoyal (2003), Sogorb (2005) and Casson et al.
(2007).
Our results also find, according to the pecking order theory, an inverse relation-
ship between leverage with debt cost (Cuñat 1999; Barry et al. 2008) and firm age
(Michaelas et al. 1999; Hall and Graham 2000; López and Sogorb 2008). As reported
in many previous studies (Giannetti 2003; Chen 2004; Huang and Song 2006; Frank
and Goyal 2009; Céspedes et al. 2010; Chakraborty 2010; Kayo and Kimura 2010),
our results revealed an inverse relationship between cash flow and indebtedness, thus
supporting the theoretical framework proposed in the pecking order theory. In other
words, the companies in our sample, in order to avoid asymmetric information, pre-
ferred internally generated funds to external resources to finance their investment
projects. Moreover, the results of model II indicate that, since the coefficient β8 is
significant, the level of asymmetric information influences the relationship of cash
flow with the level of indebtedness. These results show that when there are prob-
lems of asymmetric information (β7 = −0.4355), the firms prefer internal to external
financing, which supports the pecking order theory. On the contrary, in absence of
asymmetric information (β7 + β8 = −0.4355 + 1.2119 = 0.7764), the relationship
between cash flow and leverage is positive, supporting the trade-off theory. Then, in
absence of asymmetric information, firms with positive cash flows will prefer debt
because (a) they want to maintain their optimal capital structure; (b) they have greater
needs to shield this cash flow from corporate tax and (c) they are concerned about the
problem of over-investments, which means that they issue debt in order to discipline
the firm’s managers.
6 Conclusions
This study examined the validity of the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory to
explain the capital structures of a sample of small-sized firms of the Spanish footwear
sector. As potential determinants of the firm leverage we consider debt level of the
123
SERIEs (2013) 4:155–173 171
previous year, NDTS, growth opportunities, tangibility of assets, debt cost, age and
cash-flow.
The empirical evidence obtained indicates that small businesses face high transac-
tion costs, which are derived from typical agency problems and financial restrictions in
capital markets. The existence of such high transaction costs justifies the gap between
the target debt level and the current level of debt, together with a very slow approach
to the target debt level.
The results show that debt level has an inverse relationship with NDTS and direct
relationship with investment in fixed assets, supporting the trade-off theory. However,
the positive coefficient of growth opportunities and negative coefficients of debt cost,
age and cash flows is consistent with the prediction of the pecking order theory. These
results are partially consistent with both theories, but provide evidence of the predom-
inance of the pecking order theory over the trade-off theory when greater problems of
information asymmetries exist, which is more usual in the small-sized firms.
Growth opportunities evidenced a direct relationship with leverage. This is not sur-
prising due to the need to finance these investment opportunities with debt because
rapidly growing firms are likely to have insufficient earnings to finance all of their
growth internally. Furthermore, the low debt level of companies in the Spanish foot-
wear sector also help to explain this direct relationship due to the importance of R&D
investments for this industry, valued as strategic investments by lenders.
Finally, the inverse relationship between cash flow and debt level, in presence of
asymmetric information, supports the pecking order theory. This evidence reinforces
the idea that higher information asymmetries in small firms provide greater validity
for the pecking order theory in this type of firm. In absence of asymmetric informa-
tion, the relationship between cash flow and leverage becomes positive, supporting
the trade-off theory.
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